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 On the Logic of Values 
 MANUEL  DRIES 
ABSTRACT:  This article argues that Nietzsche’s transvaluation project refers 
not to a mere inversion or negation of a set of nihilism-prone, Judeo-Christian 
values but, instead, to a different conception of what a value is and how it 
functions. Traditional values function within a standard logical framework and 
claim legitimacy and “bindingness” based on exogenous authority with abso-
lute extension. Nietzsche regards this framework as unnecessarily reductive in 
its attempted exclusion of contradiction and real opposition among competing 
values. I  propose a nonstandard, dialetheic model of valuation that requires a 
value to be both true and false as well as neither true nor false. 
 In our Europe, life is no longer quite so uncertain, contingent, nonsensical. 
[. . .] The  power man has achieved now allows a  reduction of those means of 
discipline of which the moral interpretation was the strongest. 
 — KSA 12:5[71] 
 The logic of our conscious thinking is only a crude and facilitated form of the 
thinking needed by our organism [. . .] A simultaneity-thinking [ein Zugleich-
denken], for example, is needed of which we have hardly an inkling. […] We are 
still growing continually, our sense of time and place, etc., is still developing. 
 — KSA 11:34[124] 
 Beliefs, Values, Norms 
 Value,’ as I use it in this article, refers to “stuff”—regardless of its  ontological status—that is considered “good.” By ‘norm’ I mean prescriptions of how 
certain modes of conduct “ought” to be. There is a nonarbitrary  relationship 
between norms that prescribe actions designed to instantiate values and those 
 values themselves. Nietzsche has a number of reservations regarding the  values 
and norms active in Judeo-Christian societies. He believes that  practices are 
linked to a particular selection of values and that these values themselves 
are selected based on a small set of very basic, but immensely powerful, 
‘ 
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“incorporated assumptions” ( einverleibte Annahmen ), which I will refer to 
as  meta-valuations: “We stand under the law of the past [the most primitive 
and  longest  prehistory of humanity and animality] i.e.,  its assumptions and 
valuations ” ( KSA 9:11[334]).
 If norms are the kinds of action-inducing prescriptions that weave the fabric 
of human reality, and if norms are geared toward the adjusting of actions with 
the goal of instantiating values, and values themselves are governed by very 
powerful meta-valuations, then real change requires a revision of those meta-
valuations. With this in mind, I will provisionally circumscribe  Umwerthung 
(transvaluation) as Nietzsche’s project to 
 (i)  a nalyze and change one or several meta-valuations, with the goal to 
 (ii) affect a set of values that depend on the meta-valuations, in order to 
 (iii)  change the norms within a society.  1  
 1.  Nihilism and Transvaluation 
 1.1.  NIHILISM, META-VALUATIONS, AND THE EXCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION 
 It is clear from the  Nachlass that the motivation for Nietzsche’s transvaluation 
project is the problem of nihilism: if x believes, for example, that there are 
souls, that is, “some kind of unchanging kernel of a person that continues to 
exist beyond that same person’s death,” and x comes to believe that there are 
no such things as “souls” and yet continues to adhere to the belief that if there 
is anything that makes a person’s life worth living it can only be souls, then 
nihilism as the “falling into the opposite valuation”—“Everything is false” ( KSA 
12:2[127])—is a real threat.  2  This exclusive disjunction allows for only two 
evaluative outcomes:  either life is worth living  or it is not worth living; if there 
are no souls and souls are the kinds of things human beings require to live a 
life worth living, then life loses its value. The logic at work here is the same in 
the most comprehensive, world-negating form of nihilism: “The logical world 
negation and nihilization follows from our need to oppose being to non-being 
and the denial of the concept ‘becoming’” (autumn 1887,  KSA 12:9[62]).  3  To 
add a third example: if someone believes that absolute metaphysical truth T is a 
real possibility and then, in striving to attain this, comes to believe that there is 
no such thing as T with which our beliefs can correspond but instead only local, 
contextually valid truths, then truth is another one of the “ highest values that 
devalue themselves [ die obersten Werthe {die} sich entwerthen ]” ([1887],  KSA 
12:9[35]); if someone continues to adhere to the belief that T is of the highest 
value, the exclusive disjunction takes effect again and T’s unavailability might 
lead to the conclusion that existence without T has very little, almost no, value. 
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Nietzsche argues that, ultimately, this problem stems from a set of decisive 
meta-valuations by which we are bound and which guide most of our dependent 
values and valuations:
 The ephemerality of man may be the  effect of erroneous incorporated assumptions. 
 At the start of all mental activity stand the  coarsest assumptions and  fictions, 
e.g., Identity Thing Persistence. They are coeval with the intellect and it  is 
 essentially modeled on the latter. —Only the assumptions remained that were 
compatible with organic life. ( KSA 9:11[335]) 
 “Identity Thing Persistence,” this set of conative, evaluating meta- assumptions, 
is usually not immediately transparent to those who “hold” them; and yet they 
are active in all of our language, grammar, cognitive beliefs, and evaluations, 
 including those intersubjectively shared beliefs that are significant for a group’s 
practical decision making. They, too, are interwoven with our  meta-valuations. 
 In order to understand the phenomenon Nietzsche calls nihilism and to 
 appreciate what transvaluation is meant to achieve, we need to grapple with the 
complexity that governs conative meta-valuations and individual and shared 
conative and cognitive valuations ( Wertschätzungen ). Elsewhere I have defined 
this type of nihilism as a “function of the belief in being.”  4  The more deeply 
ingrained the conative and cognitive meta-value of being ( Sein ) understood as 
perceptual and cognitive-conceptual stability and permanence, the more virulent 
the experience of nihilism when confronted with “becoming” ( Werden ), that is, 
that which escapes any attempt of perceptual and cognitive-conceptual stabiliz-
ing rationalization and systematization. 
 Nietzsche holds that at least since Copernicus, the originally conative and now 
cognitive meta-belief in being, and dependent beliefs that value the existence 
of some kind of permanent essence of existence, has been under threat: “Since 
Copernicus man has been rolling from the centre toward x” ( KSA 12:2[127]; 
cf.  GM III:25). While this comes as no surprise to Nietzsche himself, who is 
convinced that “being” is an abstract construction and often refers to “the whole” 
( das Ganze ) with the equally abstract and problematic term ‘becoming,’ it is 
nevertheless possible to show how in many different domains of the human 
lifeworld this meta-belief in being is challenged.  5  
 But just as mere “ideas” do not turn into full-blown beliefs overnight, it also 
takes time for a strong meta-valuation, anchored at the level of drives, to revert 
to being just one among other, related drives and beliefs.  6  Nihilism emerges as 
an issue precisely during a time when a strong meta-valuation is active but a 
large number of cognitively held beliefs that are internally linked to the meta-
value and were perhaps selected because of the latter have come to be untenable. 
 Meta-valuations, in this equation, are most important because they provided the 
criteria for selecting and ordering a person’s drives, values, and beliefs. Nihilism 
is therefore first and foremost the result of incorporated, conative meta-valuations 
that clash with (sets of) experiences and beliefs that are simply opposed to a 
strong meta-valuation or that are related to  incompatible meta-valuations.  7  
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 The experience of becoming—the instability and transience that jar with the 
meta-valuation of being—surfaces in many different guises before “becoming” 
might eventually reach the status of a new competing meta-belief, which in 
turn might eventually replace and gradually ex-corporate the strong valuation 
of being. The various instances in the gradual formation and conceptualiza-
tion of becoming as competing meta-belief—one might wish to consider, for 
example, Copernicus, Kant, the French Revolution, Hegel, and Darwin as such 
instances—do not initially weaken the meta-valuation of being:  8  they first affect 
the entire web of cognitive beliefs related to that meta-valuation that remains 
intact. And precisely because that meta-valuation had served as an internal 
criterion for evaluating other beliefs, theories, and actions, the gradual dissolu-
tion that results from its confrontation with “instances of becoming” leads to a 
state of fluidity, that is, a lack of stability occasioned by the disintegration and 
necessary reweaving of a web of beliefs and affects. It is only at this point that 
a nihilism of disorientation and a nihilism of despair arise.  9  
 1.2.  NIHILISM AS META-VALUE INCOMPATIBILITY 
 In recent attempts to explain religious phenomena from the standpoint of an 
 external observer, Dennett invokes the (highly problematic) concept of “memes,” 
the name for a “self-replicating idea” first presented by the evolutionary biologist 
Dawkins.  10  A meme is supposed to refer to any element of culture that is trans-
mitted from person to person, between contemporaries and sometimes between 
generations by nongenetic means. Such memes are of problematic epistemic 
standing, to say the least, but they do allow us to model the problem of nihilism 
as a memetic incompatibility—that is, the diremptive antagonism between one 
meta-value and another, incompatible meta-value that is gaining ground. At 
first, such an incompatibility occurs only in isolated instances, until the isolated 
occurrences find their way into the domain of public consciousness. Gradually, 
the new meme complex takes on a life of its own, until it turns, perhaps through 
an event that accelerates its transmission, into a new meta-value that is then used 
to classify, group, and evaluate other beliefs.  11  
 I think we can attribute to Nietzsche the belief in something like memes, 
although they certainly do not exhaust what he refers to as “inherited” and 
 “incorporated assumptions” ( einverleibte Annahmen ) in notebook M III 1. He 
also believes, however, that some incorporated meta-assumptions—values 
 incorporated at a drive level—might no longer be necessary. As Nietzsche 
 suggests, for example, in the Lenzer Heide material titled “ European Nihilism ”: 
“[I]n our Europe, life is no longer quite so uncertain, contingent,  nonsensical. 
Such a  tremendous  potentiation of the  value of man, the value of evil, etc., is 
now less necessary: we can endure a considerable  moderation of that value, 
we can  concede much nonsense and contingency. The  power man has 
achieved now allows a  reduction of those means of discipline of which the 
moral interpretation was the strongest. ‘God’ is by far too extreme a hypothesis” 
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( KSA 12:5[71]). Rather, certain formerly valuable beliefs linked to such early 
meta-assumptions—Richardson quite rightly argued recently that according to 
Nietzsche we are “in thrall to our past”—must be actively ex-corporated, in a 
process of what he calls “unlearning” ( Verlernen ) and forgetting ( Vergessen ).  12  
Nietzsche thus suggests frequently, for example, in  Daybreak , that “we have to 
 learn to think differently [ umzulernen ]—in order at last, perhaps very late on, 
to attain even more:  to feel differently [ umzufühlen ]” ( D 103). Any complete 
“ reversing of the great already incorporated deceptions” ( KSA 11:27[41]) will, 
however, be impossible. 
 What, then, is the link between values that “live” in us as drives—it would 
almost be more correct to speak of values that live us—and the larger set of cog-
nitively held valuations that govern the personal and social world?  13  Nietzsche 
attempts to bring about a shift in our meta-assumptions in order to avoid what 
he thinks are problematic existential effects of the current diremption. Until a 
successful remapping of our web of beliefs manages to incorporate the idea of 
becoming, the nihilism remains a threat. 
 I do not propose to take this reductive, memetic model any further, but it is obvi-
ous that it has some explanatory value when we consider Nietzsche’s project.  14  
 1.3.  SIMUL  NEGATIO ET  AFFIRMATIO : TWO TRANSVALUATION CONDITIONS 
 When we read the fragment “Critique of Nihilism” the solution seems 
 straightforward. Nietzsche suggests we simply deracinate these few, strong, 
value-deciding categories such as  purpose, unity , and  permanent being 
( KSA 13:11[99].1) from our system: “Assuming we have recognized how the 
world may no longer be  interpreted with these  three categories and that upon 
this recognition the world begins to be without value for us: then we must ask 
 where our belief in these three categories came from—let us see if it isn’t possible 
to cancel our belief in  them . Once we have  devaluated these three categories, 
demonstrating that they cannot be applied to the universe  ceases to be a reason 
to devaluate the universe ” ( KSA 13:11[99].2; see also  KSA 12:6[11])—and then 
we reach the state where no exclusive disjunction can throw any unfavorable 
light upon existence (Nietzsche sometimes refers to this state as the “innocence 
of becoming”). But this, Nietzsche knows, is not straightforward. Values are 
necessary for life, and the practice of evaluating needs to continue, as life itself 
is nothing but continuous  Werthschätzen : “ The value of life lies in the valua-
tions” ( KSA 10:5[1].234). If valuation is not optional but necessary, and if all 
traditional values were related to nihilism-prone meta-values, then “new” values 
are indeed necessary and must fulfill at least two conditions: 
 (a)  the nonperpetuation condition, that is, not to perpetuate the structural 
relation to the traditional meta-values (prone to nihilism); and 
 (b)  the affirmation condition, that is, to entertain a creative-constructive 
 relationship within the kind of world that is the case. 
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 The nonperpetuation condition is necessary but not sufficient for Nietzsche’s 
project. He is aware that new types of problematic attitudes or even different 
forms of nihilism might emerge, such as value disorientation or value relativ-
ism, which undercut successful practices of valuation. The latter are, however, 
necessary for the human being’s motivational structure and the relationship it 
entertains with the lifeworld. 
 Thus, in addition to the nonperpetuation of nihilism, Nietzsche clearly argues 
that life must be regarded as  endogenously valuable (no longer valuable due 
to some exogenous structure, i.e., to be “in the image of God,” “the truth of 
being,” or any purely pragmatic goal; see above,  KSA 10:5[1].234).  15  The 
 affirmation condition refers not just to the need for the right kinds of  values 
but also to the appropriate—constructive-creative—way of arriving at and 
regarding these values. Despite Nietzsche’s frequent problematic statements 
of the kind  “all-there-is is becoming,” which apparently contradict any kind 
of permanence or  Seinssetzungen , any constructive transvaluation project 
requires a more complex framework that can accommodate  both (i) the skepti-
cal liquefaction of any “false” (simplifying) ontological and epistemological 
 Gleichsetzungen and (ii) the creative “fixing” and living with sets of values 
that yield existential projects to be affirmed. This results in a world no longer 
taken on faith as “given” but understood, in an important para-consistent sense, 
as  both given to us  and constructed-created by us and  neither simply given  nor 
simply constructed-created (both conjunction and disjunction are required to 
capture Nietzsche’s nonreductive position). Only creative-constructive activity 
in the above sense can lead, Nietzsche believes, to a sustainable nonnihilistic, 
affirmative attitude: “In the end it is not just the feeling of power [Gefühl der 
Macht], but the pleasure in creating and  the created [die Lust an dem Schaffen 
und am  Geschaffenen ]: since all activity becomes conscious as the conscious-
ness of a ‘work’” ( KSA  12:7[2]).  16  
 2.  The Logic of the Traditional Values 
 Against the backdrop of the problem of nihilism—the motivation for his value 
critique—we may now ask what kind of transvaluation Nietzsche requires to 
satisfy the second condition of a different kind of endogenous affirmation.  17  
I will approach this by responding to the following three questions. How did the 
old values function? Would the “new” values function in the same way? What 
are candidates for new values? 
 Notwithstanding my earlier insistence that the transvaluation project requires 
a change in values, I do not believe that the third question is a very helpful one, 
since Nietzsche himself insists frequently that he should not be regarded as 
the giver of new values. With regard to the first question, I will argue that the 
old  values functioned largely because they worked toward the meta- valuations 
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of permanence in the name of simplicity, security, and survival. Question 
two demands a difficult response: while old values functioned well and were 
 appropriate for a certain develop mental stage, new values will have to function 
within a different, nonreductive framework since, as we will see below, the need 
for complexity reduction and security is now no longer as urgent. 
 2.1.  HOW DID THE OLD VALUES FUNCTION? 
 What makes a value valuable? We sometimes wonder why certain decisions 
were easy or difficult, and in most cases this is due to the presence or the absence 
of any deciding value(s) that governs our “ratiocinations.” For Nietzsche, the 
exercise of reason entails cognitive and noncognitive abilities that all contribute 
to a “great reason of the body [grosse Vernunft des Leibes]” ( Z I:4). Values 
accelerate decision making by both reducing and structuring the complexity of 
any given situation. As we have already seen, Nietzsche understands values as 
extensions of 
 (i)  a protocognitive, conative, assimilatory activity that leads very early on 
to our initial meta-valuations; and 
 (ii)  a kind of protologic due to man’s early need for uncertainty avoidance 
and complexity reduction. 
 To a great extent both function within us noncognitively but then become vis-
ible in the values we are committed to and that have been selected “by” the 
protological meta-valuations. 
 Regarding the protocognitive, assimilatory activity, Nietzsche writes in 
 GS on the “Origin of the logical”: “Those, for example, who did not know 
how to find often enough what is ‘equal’ as regards both nourishment and 
hostile animals—those, in other words, who subsumed things too slowly and 
cautiously—were favored with a lesser probability of survival than those 
who guessed immediately upon encountering similar instances that they 
must be equal. The dominant tendency, however, to treat as equal what is 
merely  similar—an illogical tendency, for nothing is really equal—is what 
first created any basis for logic” ( GS  111). If decision-making  acceleration, 
qua  complexity  reduction and uncertainty  avoidance (which leads to a 
 first-personal  qualitative state that Nietzsche regards as fundamental, namely, 
the feeling of freedom as experienced power), is what made many of our 
first-order values valuable, then the success of a value depends on our level 
of commitment to it: the more committed, the more successful, the more 
valuable, it will turn out to be.  If a value’s  Verbindichkeit —its binding force 
or the level of commitment it inspires—measures the success of a value, then 
it is necessary to understand what kind of commitment was attached to the 
meta-values and to traditional values, respectively. 
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 As regards the meta-values, I have already mentioned that Nietzsche 
assumes a very strong, protocognitive commitment that began with the need 
for complexity reduction, decision-making acceleration, and uncertainty 
 avoidance. Our level of commitment to any subsequently emerging values is 
less obvious. Also, we need to distinguish more clearly between meta- valuations, 
active first-order values (e.g., the knightly-aristocratic values Nietzsche dis-
cusses in  GM I), and reactive second-order values (e.g., Judeo-Christian 
 values). Commitment to these second-order values is less immediate, and yet 
some commitment is necessary for their success.18 As we shall see, Nietzsche 
believes our commitment to values to follow the protologic that governs the 
meta- valuations. 
 I would like to note here that Nietzsche is all too often regarded as a thinker 
fundamentally opposed to logic, as someone whose explanations are premised 
on the assumption that all-there-is is  unlogisch , illogical and irrational, and 
that logic is therefore utterly negligible. This, I believe, does not do justice to 
Nietzsche’s views on logic.  19  
 2.2. THE LOGIC OF OUR COMMITMENT 
 According to Nietzsche, logic is to an extent fictional. Nietzsche aims to show 
that traditional logic depends on a protological biological and psychophysi-
ological heritage: “ our belief in things is the precondition for the belief in 
logic” ( KSA 12:9[97].67). Logic is, so to speak, “premised” on a protobe-
lief in re-identifiable objects,  identische Fälle —“Die Logik ist geknüpft an 
die Bedingung:  gesetzt, es gibt identische Fälle ” ( KSA 11:40[13])—which is 
vital for any organism, for example, to re-identify an enemy or the right kind 
of food. The possibility of any logical operation demands assimilation, and 
“[b]efore one judges  the process of assimilation must have already been  carried 
out ” ( KSA 11:40[15]). 
 In addition, logical principles such as the law of noncontradiction are seen not 
as absolutely binding but merely as an expression of a particular kind of organ-
ism’s “crude” ( grob ) way of dealing with complexity and multiplicity: “Here the 
crude, sensualist prejudice  reigns that sensations teach us  truths about things—
that I cannot say at the same time of one and the same thing that it is  hard and 
it is  soft (the instinctive proof ‘I cannot have 2 opposite sensations at the same 
time’— quite crude and false )” ( KSA 12:9[97]). Yet Nietzsche does not claim that 
there is any nonlogical sphere prior to the emergence of logic. He merely states 
that there is always already a kind of protologic at work, well before the emer-
gence of something like modern logic is possible. There is, so to speak, no brute 
emergence of logic. More developed forms of logic depend on very early, assimi-
latory, creative-poetic protologics: “ Oversimplification [ Vergröberung ] as basic 
tool in order to let appear recurrence, identical cases; prior to  ‘thinking’ [bevor 
also ‘gedacht’ wurde] one must have already  composed [ gedichtet ], the creative 
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sense is more original than that of ‘thinking’  [‘denkende’]” ( KSA  11:40[17]). 
It would therefore be too easy to claim that logic is outright rejected by Nietzsche. 
In fact, simply negating logic would show that it is logic itself that is still at 
work in its own extinguishing. 
 Nietzsche’s assumptions regarding logic are, I believe, of a different kind. He 
holds that while, at one time, the protologic was absolutely vital and necessary, 
the circumstances have now changed. Today one does not require the same 
amount of complexity reduction in order to survive. We are no longer in such 
desperate need of food or in such danger that our minds have to function solely 
with the goal to (a) forge the identical, (b) abbreviate into signs, or (c) remember, 
in order to (d) re-cognize and (e) select.  20  Logic was one of the necessary means 
of control,  Zuchtmittel , but it is today no longer  as necessary as it was when our 
world–mind–brain nexus first took shape. 
 Nietzsche believes that this protologic of mutually exclusive alternatives is 
still literally alive in us—we can only be in one experiential state at a time—and 
that we therefore find it difficult, or are even unable, to portray or understand 
complexity other than in oppositions that contradict one another. There is plenty 
of textual evidence that it is Nietzsche’s goal to integrate as much multiplicity as 
possible into the conscious sphere of the human being, a sphere that will never 
be able to simply abandon logic altogether: “the  assumption of entities is neces-
sary in order to think and infer, logic handles only formulae for what remains 
the same [. . .] the  feigned world of subject, substance, ‘reason’ is  necessary ” 
( KSA  12:9[89]). Nietzsche thinks that abolishing logic would lead to the end of the 
kind of “interpretation” man is. Instead, man needs to find a logic less simplify-
ing, less reductive, one more adequate to current needs and difficulties. While the 
principle of noncontradiction is not necessarily binding, it might be very difficult 
for human beings to think otherwise: “We do not succeed in both affirming and 
negating one and the same thing: that is a subjective empirical proposition that 
expresses not a ‘necessity’  but only a non-ability [keine ‘Nothwendigkeit’ aus, 
 sondern nur ein Nicht-vermögen ]” ( KSA  12:9[97]). Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s 
late writings plainly show his conviction in our capacity for other, less reduc-
tive modes of thought. In the same way as a new understanding of freedom 
requires the simultaneity of “free” and “~ free” (“as something one has and has 
 not ” [ TI  “Skirmishes” 38]), he demands at the end of  Ecce Homo that the task 
of revaluation requires “the art of separating without making inimical, to mix 
nothing, to ‘reconcile’ nothing; a tremendous variety that is nevertheless the 
opposite of chaos—this was the precondition, the long secret work and artistry 
of my instinct” ( EH “Clever” 9). 
 This is of course not to say that Nietzsche globally favors contradic-
tion over consistency. There are many cases where he himself engages in 
 indirect arguments, points his finger at problematic contradictions, and chal-
lenges a theory or belief. This in itself is no proof that Nietzsche values 
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consistency—it might simply be evidence of his awareness that many other 
people do. But as is well documented, Nietzsche is not interested in aban-
doning inference rules or proof theory unless, and this I regard as crucial, he 
believes that reductive constraints hamper rational capacities. As we shall 
see, in specific cases when a logical field runs up against its own presupposi-
tions, it might be more correct and more rational to regard a contradiction as 
correct. Explosion or  ex contradictione quodlibet is never really an issue for 
any circumspect user of logic, and neither is it for Nietzsche. Explosion is 
the result of following syntactical rules within a chosen semantic domain, a 
blind rule-following that Nietzsche (like most of us) would reject. A variety of 
constraints follow from how we populate our domain over which the syntacti-
cal rules range. In logic as in life we always need rules about rule-following. 
And just as we consider different types of evidence to establish whether 
something is true or false, we will consider different types of evidence as 
to whether a contradiction is true or not. We have abundant evidence that 
Nietzsche is not a trivialist. 
 Finally, the acceptance of contradictions allows for a variety of responses. 
Modifying one’s view and making it consistent is certainly one response, but it 
is by no means the only rationally acceptable position. Only in the absence of 
any other relevant reasons might one reject a theory or a belief based simply on 
inconsistency. In circumstances where there are good reasons for sticking with 
a contradiction, it might actually be more rational to do so.  21  
 After this short discussion of Nietzsche’s view of logic we can return to the 
problem of values that function within the logic we have incorporated. 
 2.3.  EXOGENOUS AUTHORITY AND ABSOLUTE EXTENSION 
 I have so far argued that Nietzsche assumes that we all are always already bound 
by and committed to a set of meta-valuations on a protoconscious—or rather 
consciousness-enabling—level. There is only so much we can do about our level 
of commitment to the latter, and if it were not for these meta-valuations and the 
protologic we would not have become the kinds of “things” we are. 
 The “knightly-aristocratic” values treated in  On the Genealogy of Morals were 
a “logical” extension of our incorporated meta-assumptions of an equally binding 
quality:  22  control over one’s environment, uncertainty avoidance, survival, and 
the immediate experience and expression of strength and activity, according to 
Nietzsche, immediately validate the knightly-aristocratic evaluations. I do not 
intend to go into the details of the value shift (strong/weak to good/evil) that 
Nietzsche describes in  GM . What interests me here is the new kind of com-
mitment or bindingness of the Judeo-Christian values, as they are the target of 
Nietzsche’s transvaluation. The values Nietzsche targets still depend on the same 
set of meta-valuations, but they can no longer rely on any immediate validation 
as they are only indirectly related to our drive-based meta-valuations. Instead, 
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in order to ensure our commitment, they draw on exogenous authority and claim 
universal, infinite extension. 
 What is meant by  exogenous authority ? This authority is guarded by an author-
ity (such as a church) itself based on another authority (such as a deity). 
 What do I mean by  infinite extension ? The values are not context-dependent 
and local but, instead, claim ahistorical, universal validity, that is, a validity that 
knows no bounds and extends ad infinitum. 
 It is their presumed metaphysical  absolute authority and their ahistorical, 
 infinite extension that explain the kinds of actions committed in the name of 
traditional value systems: the world considered worthy ends precisely where 
the values not yet accepted begin. For systems of  exogenously authorized, uni-
versal and thus infinitely extending values , the space that is not already part of 
the values’ influence becomes a no-man’s-land that will be assimilated. There 
is simply “no space” for any other system of valuation. 
 It is here that the Judeo-Christian values function according to the logic that 
sprung from the initial, preconscious, incorporated meta-assumptions: the space 
they govern is bivalent, and they function according to the exclusive disjunction. 
This leads to both internal and external problems for a transvaluation. 
 Internally , for example, within one and the same group, any value change is 
difficult: those committed to a value are required to act upon their absolute com-
mitment and defend the value’s absolute authority. Those who wish to propose 
new values can only do so by also claiming a similar kind of exogenous author-
ity. This results in an internal opposition that is treated like a contradiction. It 
demands a resolution that restores absolute authority, universal validity, and 
absolute extension of one or the other value. 
 Externally , for example, among different groups, a similar opposition arises, 
again in the guise of a contradiction that demands a resolution. The other group 
either is committed to the same system of values or is  not , but then in this case, 
it  is not (on the map). The external contradiction will demand a resolution that 
again restores the absolute authority, universal validity, and absolute extension 
of either the one or the other set of values. 
 Values that function in this way perpetuate the nihilistic structure, as they are 
still firmly committed to the nihilism-prone meta-values. They also fail with 
regard to endogenous affirmation. In order to successfully “transvalue” values, the 
internal logic according to which values and valuation function needs changing. 
 3.  New Values: Contradictory and Oppositional 
 3.1. REEVALUATING CONTRADICTION AND OPPOSITION 
 As I said earlier, the first step toward different values is to loosen some of the 
logical restrictions Nietzsche thinks were once necessary but now need to be 
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“unlearned.” Unlearning the fear of complexity, contradiction, and opposition is 
a first step. As I will argue—extending Nadeem J. Z. Hussain’s recent proposal 
for a fictionalist value practice of “regarding things as valuable even when we 
know that they are not” beyond the bounds of moral fictionalism—new values 
are constitutively contradictory (both binding and not-binding) and thus open to 
real opposition, thereby ensuring their nonnihilistic and affirmative continuity.  23  
I will first look at Nietzsche’s reevaluation of contradiction and opposition. 
 (i)  Contradictions ( Widersprüche ) are no longer to be seen as purely  negative, 
requiring any resolution governed by a logic of mutually exclusive 
 alternatives. 
 When it comes to contradictions, Nietzsche is a dialetheic thinker who accepts, 
like Hegel before him and Graham Priest today, that some contradictions can 
be true. Nietzsche thinks, for example, that any locally valid truths lead, at their 
limits, to ineradicable contradictions.  24  See, for example, this early passage 
critical of inductive universalism taken from  Philosophy in the Tragic Age of 
the Greeks : 
 All our conceptions, as soon as their empirically given content, drawn from 
our  perceivable world, is taken as  veritas aeterna lead to contradictions 
[Widersprüche]. If there is absolute motion, then there is no space: if there is 
absolute space, then there is no motion; if is there is absolute being, then there is no 
multiplicity. It should become clear how little we touch the heart of things or undo 
the tangle of reality [den Knoten der Realität aufknüpfen]: [. . .] these concepts 
are not intended to stand the test of actuality and be corrected by it, as they are 
actually derived from it, on the contrary they are supposed to measure and judge 
actuality and, in case of a logical contradiction, even condemn it. ( PTAG 12) 
 Nietzsche holds that contradictions are necessary because they are creative:
 Necessary contradictions in thought [Nothwendige Widersprüche im Denken], 
in order to be able to live. Logical thinking with the yearning for science creates 
a new type of existence [neue Daseinsform]. 
 Pure thinking seeks to explain everything to itself and functions not in an active 
and transformative way [nicht aktiv und umgestaltend]. ( KSA 7:7[58]) 
 And in his late note (June–July 1885) on the “new world-conception” Nietzsche 
insists that “all there is” functions precisely because of its benevolent, creative, 
inconsistent tension. The “world” (Nietzsche’s quotation marks) is in states 
of change, it can only have inconsistent state descriptions, and any attempt to 
describe it fully and without contradictions will fail: “force everywhere, as a play 
of forces and force-waves [als Spiel von Kräften und Kraftwellen] simultaneously 
one and ‘many’ [. . .] self-contradictory [Sich-selber-widersprechendste], and then 
coming home from abundance to simplicity, from the play of contradiction [dem 
Spiel der Widersprüche] back to the pleasure of harmony” ( KSA 11:38[12]). 
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 (ii)  Oppositions ( Gegensätze ) are no longer to be misconceived as  particular 
kinds of contradictions, treated according to the principle of noncontra-
diction and demanding mutually exclusive, annihilatory resolution.  25  
 For Nietzsche, mutually exclusive oppositions do not really exist. Instead, they 
are to be conceived as  Gradverschiedenheiten , differences in degree, and it is 
only our particular way of seeing, our incorporated, crude meta-optic, that makes 
it difficult to no longer consider them as either/or alternatives:
 Duration, conformity with itself, being, inhere neither in what is called the subject 
nor in what is called object. They are complexes of what happens which appear 
to have duration in relation to other complexes—for example due to a difference 
in tempo (rest–motion, fixed–slack: all these are oppositions which don’t exist in 
themselves and in fact only express  differences in degree [ Gradverschiedenheiten ] 
that look like oppositions when viewed through a particular prism. 
 There are no oppositions: we have only acquired the concept of opposition from 
those of logic, and from there wrongly transferred it to things. ( KSA 12:9[91]; 
see also the famous earlier passage in  WS 67) 
 Like contradictions, oppositions are positive and creative unless they demand 
any simple either/or resolution: “I believe that from the presence of oppositions, 
and from their awareness, emerges the great man, the arch with a great tension 
[der  Bogen mit der großen Spannung ]” ( KSA 11:35[18]). Against the leveling of 
the levelers, the  Nivellierer , Nietzsche wants a new antithetic–synthetic practice: 
“I wish, also in matters of the mind, war and oppositions; and more war than 
ever, more oppositions than ever before” ( KSA 11:36[17]). 
 Finally, after our discussion of nihilism, incorporated meta-valuations, a spe-
cific (species-typical) logic of mutual exclusiveness, and the traditional values 
that function exclusively within the latter, we can return to the transvaluation 
project. My goal is to show that any new value will have to break with this species-
specific logic of mutual exclusivity, in order to avoid traditional nihilism-prone 
value composition, and to lead to what I wish to call an endogenously  affirmable, 
creative value praxis that is no longer dependent on traditional  exogenous, 
 metaphysical affirmation. 
 3.2. “LIVING” VALUES WITH INCONSISTENT COMMITMENT 
 The  value of life lies in the evaluations: evaluations are  created [Werthschätzungen 
sind  Geschaffenes ], not taken up, learned, experienced. The created must be anni-
hilated [vernichtet], in order to make room for the newly created: the evaluations’ 
 ability to live requires their ability to be annihilated. The creator must always be 
an annihilator [Vernichter]. Valuing itself, however, cannot annihilate itself:  this, 
however, is life . ( KSA 10:5[1].234) 
 We saw earlier that the universal validity, absolute bindingness, and infinite exten-
sion of the old values, based on exogenous authority, undermine the  creation of 
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new values and make Nietzsche’s own transvaluation project  difficult, since any 
different and locally selected values will always be conceived as merely relative 
and unable to compete with values of absolute standing. We also saw that within 
the old framework, the success of any new value depends on this claim to exog-
enous authority and absolute extension, thereby perpetuating a violent circularity 
aimed at minimizing uncertainty and eradicating any real value tension. 
 The transvaluation Nietzsche requires cannot take place within this framework 
and can no longer operate with values of the above kind. And although Nietzsche 
agrees in  TI that in earlier times, “they had just  one choice: either perish or—be 
 absurdly rational ” ( TI “Socrates” 10), he believes that this is no longer the 
case (see above,  KSA 12:5[71]). More important for Nietzsche, the extension 
of the either/or logic that has helped us in the past ultimately culminates in the 
nihilism scenario: “It remains to either abolish our adorations [Verehrungen] 
or ourselves. The latter is nihilism” ( KSA 12:2[131]). I will now propose the 
dialetheic framework required for new values. As Nietzsche himself writes in 
his 1885 plan of the transvaluation, the mutually exclusive contradictions among 
competing valuations must be replaced by a new framework, within which they 
no longer annihilate one another:
 Prodigious forces are unleashed; but contradicting each another 
 the  unleashed forces  annihilating each other 
 to bind the unleashed forces anew, so they no longer annihilate each other and 
 to open one’s eyes for the real  increase of force! 
 [Ungeheure Gewalten sind entfesselt; aber sich widersprechend 
 die  entfesselten Kräfte sich gegenseitig  vernichtend 
 die entfesselten Kräfte neu zu binden, daß sie sich nicht gegenseitig
vernichten und 
 Augen aufmachen für die wirkliche  Vermehrung an Kraft!] ( KSA  12:2[100]) 
 Values, too, have to be accepted as what they are, namely, to an important 
extent something “fabricated,” “created”;  26  as Nietzsche insists in the important 
early passage in his 1882 notes on  Zarathustra , “[E]valuations are  created , not 
taken up, learned, experienced” ( KSA 10:5[1].234). Values can no longer claim 
any absolute authority. The context that leads to their  creation is key. In the 
same passage he further demands that (like all “living creatures”) values must 
remain theoretically and practically revisable: “the evaluations’  ability to live 
requires their ability to be annihilated.” After his description of valuation, he 
envisages the authors of such new valuations: “The creator must always be an 
annihilator.” These claims seem particularly puzzling as Nietzsche demands 
that new values are binding, have a real effect, and give real guidance. A value thus 
needs to be  both binding  and not-binding. It needs to be understood as  created, 
as binding, and as revisable. The fragment ends with a rhetorical  maneuver 
that is very common throughout Nietzsche’s works, namely, the equivocation 
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of the very limit of his analysis with “life”: “Valuing itself, however, cannot 
annihilate itself:  this, however, is life ” ( KSA 10:5[1].234). 
 In what sense are the new values binding? Any new valuation  both must 
be binding  and yet can no longer claim any exogenous universality. Any new 
valuation  both must be binding  and must be understood as a contextual, cre-
ative act. Any new valuation must be  both binding  and revisable; and its revis-
ability must remain transparent if its effectiveness and its “vitality” are to be 
guaranteed. As I will argue, it is crucial to comprehend Nietzsche’s call to 
“understand a  hypothesis  as hypothesis and yet accept it as regulative [eine 
 Hypothese  als Hypothese zu fassen und doch als regulativisch zu nehmen]” 
( KSA 11:26[263]). 
 3.3.  THE DIALETHEIC LOGIC OF TRANSVALUATION 
 Let us compare the two frameworks. In the traditional absolutist or universalist 
framework, all values (that matter) are ahistorical and static, of unquestion-
able authority and unlimited applicability: exogenous authority and infinite 
 extension, within the traditional logical framework of mutually exclusive alter-
natives, are geared toward the annihilation of one of two competing (sets of) 
values. 
 As we have seen, according to Nietzsche, new nonnihilistic values must func-
tion differently and need to be inserted into an adualistic sphere in which they 
are  neither together  nor separate,  both separate  and together, to ensure that 
oppositions are in a living relation, bound together, but without annihilating 
one another. A passage from the  Nachlass of summer–autumn 1884 is crucial 
to grasping Nietzsche’s different understanding of what a nonnihilistic value 
system must live up to: “All former moralities I regard as built up based on 
 hypotheses regarding the means of preservation of a  type [Erhaltungs-Mittel 
eines  Typus ]—but up to now the kind of mind was still too weak and too uncertain 
of itself to understand a  hypothesis  as hypothesis and yet [my emphasis—M.D.] 
accept it as regulative—it required  faith ” ( KSA 11:26[263]). New values can no 
longer be ahistorical, absolute, and universal. Instead, they are constructed and 
therefore in principle always revisable. And yet, simultaneously, they must be 
binding in order to serve as value, to be of value. As I said earlier, they must be 
more than (and here I agree with Richardson and Katsafanas) any  fictionalist 
“simulacrum,”  27  but in order not to relapse into a nihilism-prone traditional 
value, they must not simply be conceived as functioning differently as values 
“generated by a superior method for valuing, and (in  that sense) are ‘truer’ 
than other values.”  28  While they are “truer” to the extent that they are less 
partial, they always remain prone to relapsing into what Nietzsche describes in 
 Human, All Too Human as our inherited tendency to blindly “take itself as the 
goal and measure of things” ( HH P:6). Such truer values cannot function in the 
traditional way. 
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 In order to guard against any such relapse into the old value practice, a new 
value’s authority and extension must be conceived dialetheically, as fragment 
21[263] of notebook W I 2,  HH P:6, and many other passages show, as absolutely 
relative and relatively absolute. They no longer operate within a framework in 
which opposition is mutually exclusive and demands necessarily resolution. 
Instead, the adualistic–dialetheic status enables a contest among coequals:  both 
valid  and not valid,  neither valid  nor not valid. The conjunction will guarantee 
a living exchange, a value praxis that remains creative and “alive.” The dis-
junction (which is no longer geared toward mutual exclusivity) guarantees that 
(a) no simple annihilation can take place and (b) no simple relativism allows the 
unreflective coexistence of traditionally conceived universalist values. Instead, 
this complex logical relationship allows for values (or sets of values) to interact, 
to reach each other, to reach  into the other value sphere, testing it,  con testing it, 
but without taking over the other’s space or annihilating the other. This is what 
a new value practice would have to look like once the traditional, universalistic 
value practices have been abandoned. 
 It is necessary, Nietzsche thinks, to make transparent the constructivist aspect 
in each value and value system. Seeing a value as constructed must not, how-
ever, devalue the value or make it less real. This would be to misunderstand 
what values are. On the contrary, he believes that it will make a value more real 
because it is no longer accepted on faith but instead on the basis of creativity, 
continuous testing and transformation, which in turn will lead to an affirmative 
relation to a value or (sets of) values. A working value practice, Nietzsche held, 
is essential for any successful species. A value that is made (more) transpar-
ent, using genealogy as a tool to reveal the function it has been selected for by 
nature or by custom, will no longer be accepted simply as given, as true and 
unconditionally valid. Instead, it will be regarded as partial and hypothetical, as 
a once creative event. Under genealogical scrutiny all values lose their certainty 
and acquire a status that is simultaneously certain and uncertain, binding and 
nonbinding. Conceiving of our values within a dialetheic framework—as both 
true and not true, neither true nor not true—might in the long run incorporate a 
minimal distance toward them and enable us “to feel differently” ( D 103). As a 
result, one is no longer more or less “lived” by one’s values but is instead able 
to take what Richardson calls a “selective stance”:  29  “the continuously creative, 
instead of the once upon a time, the past” ( KSA 11:26[288]). 
 Where traditional values provided a sense of certainty and knowledge 
about action, a dialetheic value requires a new attitude toward uncertainty 
( Ungewißheit ) and nescience ( Unwissenheit ). Traditional systems of values 
sought to avoid uncertainty. For Nietzsche, a different  positive notion of uncer-
tainty and ignorance or nescience needs to be “learned”: “to have and learn the 
will to nescience [den Willen zur Unwissenheit haben und hinzulernen]” ( KSA 
11:26[294]). Life itself positively depends on uncertainty, even though natural 
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selection at an early stage selected drives and values that opposed it. We must 
become aware that “without this kind of nescience life itself would be impossible, 
that it is a condition for life alone to preserve itself and to flourish [ohne diese 
Art Unwissenheit das Leben selber unmöglich wäre, daß sie eine Bedingung 
ist, unter welcher das Leben allein sich erhält und gedeiht]” ( KSA 11:26[294]). 
But again, not-knowing also has a dialetheic status, and is thus something to be 
affirmed and avoided simultaneously. Decision making in the face of uncertainty 
is a decision making that constantly faces up to and reckons with uncertainty. 
All previous value systems were built—are still being built—to shield from 
uncertainty and to give the impression of certainty (in Nietzsche’s eyes, a false, 
nihilism-prone sense of certainty: if the value of a value lies in its uncertainty 
avoidance, it will devalue itself when faced with continued uncertainty). Instead, 
the known unknowns and the unknown unknowns that together affect our plans 
and actions need to be kept in sight, must remain part of new “systems” within 
which nonabsolute values have normative force despite the need for revisability: 
“a great, solid cover of uncertainty must encase you” ( KSA 11:26[294]). The 
task, therefore, is to create values rather than to pretend to discover them: “One 
 wanted a God or a pure conscience [reines Gewissen] in order to  shy away 
from the task that demands of man  creativity [ Schaffen ]” ( KSA 11:26[347]).  30  
And the task of constructing new dialetheic, binding and not-binding values, 
in principle revisable under non-eliminable uncertainty, is key to the project of 
value transvaluation. 
 Conclusion 
 We can finally return to our initial value test, the  nonperpetuating condition , 
and the  affirmation condition . This new kind of permeable value no longer 
perpetuates the nihilism scenario. In its more transparent epistemic status, in its 
absolute-relative stability, it creates a vital distance from the strong, absolutist, 
nihilism-prone values that were supported by conative meta-valuations. 
 But what about the  affirmation condition ? As this new kind of value can no 
longer claim absolute authority and must instead remain uncertain and there-
fore “alive”—dynamic both internally within a rank order of drives ( HH P:6) 
and externally against other, competing values—it must be affirmed and tested 
in order to establish, question, and reaffirm its validity. The link between the 
creativity and sustainability of this practice is difficult. A few hints must suffice 
here. Nietzsche’s view on values as creative acts requires the careful rereading 
and revaluation of the passages on the phenomenology of free will, such as the 
famous passage of  TI : “How is freedom measured, in individuals as well as 
nations? By the resistance which must be overcome, the effort it costs to stay 
 on top . The highest type of free men would need to be sought in the place where 
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the greatest resistance is constantly being overcome: a short step away from 
tyranny, right on the threshold of the danger of servitude” ( TI “Reconnaissance 
Raids” 38).  31  In a nutshell, Nietzsche’s argument for creative (value) prac-
tices no longer based on blind faith goes as follows: (1) creativity involves 
a transformation; (2) a  transformation involves the successful overcoming of 
a resistance; (3) the successful creative overcoming of a resistance leads to 
the feeling of self-efficacy; (4) organisms (such as human beings) register the 
result of successful resistance as a first-personal feeling of freedom. It follows, 
given Nietzsche’s assumption that (5) being aware of efficacy, that is, feeling 
free, is a condition for a form of life to be self-sustaining, (6) only a creative-
transformative value practice can guarantee the affirmative and self-sustaining 
resilience of a practice.  32  
 For a new value practice to function and sustain itself it must then become a 
creative ( schöpferische ) practice. Understood as creative and no longer as blindly 
coercive, Nietzsche believes, values can become and remain  of value to those 
who live them, select them, and are lived by them. As Nietzsche advises in an ear-
lier (summer–autumn 1884) plan of the transvaluation that underlines his belief 
in “the creative force (binding oppositions, synthetically)” ( KSA 11:26[204]) of 
a “continuously creative” ( KSA 11:26[288]), transformative value practice: “no 
longer the meek phrase ‘all is  only subjective,’ but instead ‘it is also  our work!’ 
of which let us be proud!” ( KSA 11:26[284]). 
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 NOTES 
 The epigraph from  KSA 12:5[71] is referred to as the “Lenzer Heide” material of June 10, 1887. 
All translations of citations from Nietzsche’s unpublished writings are my own. Other translations 
have been consulted whenever possible, notably the  Nachlass selections contained in  Writings 
from the Late Notebooks , ed. Rüdiger Bittner, trans. Kate Sturge (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); and  Writings from the Early Notebooks , ed. Raymond Geuss and 
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Alexander Nehamas, trans. Ladislaus Löb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
Citations from  Twilight of the Idols are from Duncan Large’s translation (Oxford University Press, 
1998). Translations of citations from  Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks are my own. 
  1.  The English ‘revaluation’ would be an accurate translation of the German ‘Neubewertung,’ 
‘Nachbewertung,’ or ‘Aufwertung,’ i.e., to evaluate something for a second time (primarily in 
a financial context). It does not, however, capture the sense of penetrating and transforming 
traditional value practices, for which Nietzsche coined the term ‘Umwerthung.’ I believe,  pace 
Large and Brobjer, that the Latin prefix  trans -, meaning “pass through, penetrate” as well as 
“surpassing, transcending” ( Oxford English Dictionary ), captures this quite well. 
  2.  The full context of the passage from the period of autumn 1885–autumn 1886 is 
“Rückschlag von ‘Gott ist die Wahrheit’ in den fanatischen Glauben ‘Alles ist falsch.’” 
  3.  “Die logische Weltverneinung und Nihilisirung folgt daraus, daß wir Sein dem Nichtsein 
entgegensetzen müssen, und daß der Begriff ‘Werden’ geleugnet wird.” 
  4.  Manuel Dries, “Towards Adualism: Becoming and Nihilism in Nietzsche’s Philosophy,” in 
 Nietzsche on Time and History , ed. Manuel Dries (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 114–18. 
  5.  As I have argued elsewhere, the term ‘becoming’ is neither simply opposed to nor denotes 
the negation of “being” (“Towards Adualism,” 133). 
  6.  On the concept of drives, see Paul Katsafanas, “Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology,” in 
 Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche , ed. John Richardson and Ken Gemes (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, forthcoming), who defines Nietzsche’s drives as “dispositions that induce affective 
orientations in an agent.” 
  7.  Bernard Reginster, in  Nihilism and the Affirmation of Life (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2006), distinguishes two main forms of nihilism, nihilism of disorientation 
and nihilism of despair. The assumptions of value realism and normative objectivism lead to 
nihilistic disorientation in the face of a value antirealism. The fact that a person’s highest values 
cannot be realized, are necessarily unattainable, leads to the conviction that life in its entirety 
is devoid of meaning—the need for meaning being an anthropological constant. Ken Gemes, 
in “Nihilism and the Affirmation of Life: A Review of and Dialogue with Bernard Reginster” 
( European Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 3 [2008]: 459–66), has pointed out that nihilism 
needs to be understood also as an incompatibility of drives, i.e., on a level that gives rise to the 
higher-order beliefs upon which nihilisms of disorientation and despair are based. Nihilism, as 
I have argued in “Towards Adualism,” is rooted in the incorporated, drive-based meta-belief 
in a stable, predictable world of self-identical things (what Nietzsche means by the concept 
“being”) that is incompatible with the increasing awareness and confrontation with “becoming,” 
the realization and experience of the provisionality of any such stability, unity, permanence, and 
systematicity. 
 8.  See Manuel Dries, “The Paradigm of Becoming” (Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Cambridge, 2006). 
  9.  Simon May’s recent emphasis on a “full-bloodied nihilism” that is “to will—often 
passionately—what is nothing [. . .] wills what is not human life, not the world of transience, 
chance, fate, and time in which we are actually situated” (“Nihilism and the Free Self,” in 
 Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy , ed. Ken Gemes and Simon May [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009], 89) is the result of—being lived by—one’s incorporated meta-
assumption of being. 
 10. Richard Dawkins coined the term ‘meme’ from Greek ‘mimema,’ “that which is imitated,” 
on the pattern of ‘gene.’ In  The Selfish Gene he quotes the example by his colleague Humphrey, 
who suggested that “the meme for, say, ‘belief in life after death’ is actually realized physically 
millions of times over, as a structure in the nervous systems of individual men the world over” 
( The Selfish Gene [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989], 192). 
 11.  I have argued elsewhere that Nietzsche’s problematic idea of an  ewige Wiederkehr is 
intended to initiate such an event (“Towards Adualism,” 119). 
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 12 . See John Richardson, “Nietzsche’s Problem of the Past,” in  Nietzsche on Time and History , 
ed. Manuel Dries (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 95. 
 13 . See John Richardson’s analysis of drives as dispositions to behavior that tend to issue 
in some usual outcome—“a drive is a plastic disposition to this outcome” ( Nietzsche’s New 
Darwinism [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004], 74–75). On the selective process that leads 
to drives that serve—or served—“life” by “looking ahead” toward a goal and simultaneously 
“bring about power,” see Richardson, “Nietzsche’s Problem of the Past,” 92–96. 
 14 . It is important to emphasize that Nietzsche would have thought that man cannot live 
by “memes” alone. Explanations provided by natural science are also insufficient. Somehow, 
man’s beliefs and self-image must leave room for agency and allow for a creativity that provides 
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